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Nr. Stason I'lay 20, 1970 
FINAL EXAl'lINATION 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRM.JSACTIONS 
I. (20 points) 
Zenith, a small U.S. tractor manufacturing company 
with sales branches in West Germany, England, and France. 
and with plans to manufacture and sell tractors in those " 
nations through whol!y-owned subsidiaries to be created 
there in the near future, contracted with similar companies 
Alpha and Beta to consolidate their foreign branches with 
its own for more effective and economical marketing in 
those three nations, in order to meet local competition 
that waS threatening to drive them out altogether. In a 
separate but re~ated agreement, Zenith contracted with 
Alpha: and Beta that (a) the three would maintain uniform 
prices on their U.S. sales; (b) each would confine its 
U.S. Sales efforts to a different geographic zone, and 
(c) no ~~o of them would build and operate their contem-
plated foreign subsidiaries in the same country, but that 
Alpha would do so only in West Germany, Beta in France 
and Zenith in the United Kingdom. 
This contract was put into effect, and the foreign 
subsidiaries created and put into operation, with great 
benefit to all parties regarding both foreign and domestic 
operations. Shortly thereafter, however, the Antitrust 
Division of the Department of Justice filed suit against 
these three companies for violation of United States 
Anti trust laws, and the case duly w'ent to trial in the 
Southern District of New York. 
What arguments should be made by (a) the government, 
to establish violation, and (b) the companies, as joint 
defendants, to convince the court that no violation had 
occurred? What should the court decide on each of the 
issues here involved, and why? 
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II. (20 points) 
Under the recently concluded "Kennedy Round" of 
import-duty reductions under GATT, the United States 
became bound to refrain from imposing more than 10% 
duty upon Mark III widgets imported from any other 
signatory nation. Three questions: 
A. Nark III widgets are manufactured in Sylvania, 
which is not a GATT signatory, but with which the U.S. 
has a Friendship Commerce and Navigation treaty containing 
the usual sort of most-facored nation clause. 
Apart from GATT, the U.S. is not explicitly bound 
by treaty regarding rate of duty upon his product, and 
the U.S. duty tariff, established prior to GATT and not 
since explicitly modified regarding this particular product. 
provides for 15% duty thereon. Therefore, the collector 
of customs at the port of entry assessed duty at the latter 
rate; importer paid, under protest regarding th:! 5% above 
GATT rate. 
What result will there be upon the importer's suit 
in the Customs Court for refund of this 5% "excess"? 
What legal argu~ents could be made in favor of the refund? 
B. Leninia, a GATT-signatory socialist nation, 
wishes to establish its manufactures abroad in order to 
earn hard curency from free-economy nations. Its autho-
rities decided that the best way to do so waS to export 
"loss leaders" thereto. Aware of the anti-dumping 
restrictions of GATT and of the countermeasures that 
signatories may properly take under that treaty, Leninia 
manufactured excellent work-shoes in huge quanti ties in 
a factory especially made for the purpose. While these 
actually cost the factory (barebones cost; advertising, 
transportation, administrative overhead, etc. excluded) 
$6/pr., they were retailed by the government to the 
Leninian populace for two years the equivalent of $5/pr., 
and then exported to only one country -the U.S.A. - and 
there retailed at the same price. Comparable domestic 
shoes, or shoes imported from other nations, then sold 
for $10/pr. 
Originally, the U.S. charged only the usual rate of 
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duty on these shoes - 15%. However the customs 
auth<:rities.soon heard of the low ~etail price and 
the ~nfury ~t was causing on sales of comparable shoes 
from do~e~t1c and other foreign sources. Finding that 
the Len~nJ..an shoes were being "dumped" the customs 
authorities raised the duty rate to co~pensate therefor • 
. The im~ortersJ a state trading company created for 
thJ..s part:cular purpose by Leninia, paid under protest 
and sued J..n the Customs Court for a refund and determin-
ation that the increase was improner under GATT as dis-
• ... 4 
crJ..mJ..natory agaJ..nst a member state. 
What arguments can be made on each side. What 
resul t? 
III. (20 points) 
Giganticul}lJ Ltd. Schultz, GmbH, and Lorraine 
Industrie, S.A.-respectively, English, West German 
and French manufacturers of competing sheet steel and 
tube, contracted in 1965 to divide among themselves the 
world sales territories, including the United States, to 
avoid mutual the competition that waS damaging all three. 
Therefore, they agreed that each could sell unlimited 
quantities of its product in the country of its incor-
pora tion (" siege social" being considered the equivalent 
thereof for purposes of the contract), but that each 
would be bound by its assigned quota-subject to change 
by mutual agreement- regarding exports to other nations. 
These quotas were made enforceable by fines. 
The U.S. quota assigned to each waS more than its 
then exports to that country. However, since then world 
trade conditions have improved, for some years each 
company has filled its U.S. quota. Whether or not it 
now could exceed that quota profitably is not known, as 
no contract signatory had attempted to do so. 
Exports to the U.S. are handled here for all three 
companies by Jones Brothers, Inc., a Delaware corporation, 
whose shares are owned entirely by U.S. citizens. Jones 
Brothers arranges for the payment of import duties, 
compliance with other customs formalities, and sale to 
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u.s. wholesalers, wI-AD , in t u rn" sell -t;o U eS. retail 
outlets .. Neither Jones,nor the wholesalers, :nor retailers 
have any dir~ct~connecticns with the three European 
manufacturers here involved, except f'or Jones' agreement 
wi th each of them to perf'orm the above mentioned services 
on commission. None have anything whatever to do with 
the contract among the manufacturers and its quota pro-
visions; in fact, as that contract was secret, none or 
them even kn~l of the quota system until receiving publi ~ 
notice through filing of' the current antitrust action. 
Each or the three manu:fac"'urers has a trade repre-
sentative in New York , who maintains a small or:fice ror 
the display or samples and handling of' queries. None or 
these will take orders or have anything whatever directly 
to do with sales. 
The anti trust division , in some f'rustration ~ asks you. ~~C 
rind a basis under U.S. antitrust laws to stop their 
seeming violation through the U.s. quota established 
by this contract. 
What violations of' our antitrust laws, if' any, have 
been committed by establishment of the contract quotas '? 
Ir violations do exist, C2n they be stopped? How? 
How might the United Stat~s Supreme Court have 
decided these issues, had they been pre3 ented to it 
in 1910? 
IV. (20 points) 
Holly Co., an English manufacturer.or ornamenta~ 
glassware or a distinctive pattern, reg~stered a val~d 
English trademark therefor-"Hollyglass"- and filed it 
under the International Convention f'or the Protection 
or Industrial Property in all other signatory nations 
including the U.S. Thereaf'ter ., Holly mc.n1..\ractu:-ed all 
of this glassware under the +.rademark ~hus reg~stered and 
riled in the United Kingdom, and sold ~ t successrul:y rOT: 
several years in some signatory states: as well as ~n 
England. It did not sell in the U.S., 'hnvlever! where =. 
preliminary rearketing reports discouraged ser~ous sales 
erforts. 
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In 1969, the defendant b~gan to nanufacture and sell 
a similar product in the U.S. under the ITHo11yglass IT trade-
mark, which it made no attempt to register anywhere~ On 
Holly's U.S" suit for infringement of ~his t~ademark , 
\'.hat result, and why? 
v. (20 points) 
The yea r is 1950. Pierre, a citizen of the Republic 
of France, asks you how he can make some money by the 
purchase and sale, including short sale, of both monetary 
gold and the national currencies of the United Statp.s, the 
Uni ted Iangdom, France and v-Je st Germany. He rules out the 
usual form of arbitrage, instead wishing to gamble on 
profitable (from his standpoint) developments that may be 
generated under the new International Monetary FUnd agree~ 
ment with its fixed member-nation currency ratios and 
~eserve-currency/gold system. If you had a crystal ball 
that would reveal developments in the international gold 
and money markets from 1950 to date under the TI-1F Agree-
ment, wha.t advice would you giv~ Pierre (with approximate 
timing of his moves), and why? 
How would you alter your advice for Pierre, if 
naturalized U.S. citizen and permanent resident of New York ? 
